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Despite the predominant inclination towards the grad-
ualist approach to reforms in the initial transition years, 
economic indicators suggest that big bang reformers have 
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demonstrated a superior performance over the last (few) 
decade(s). Still, the approach to (post-)transition pro-
cesses should be multidimensional and include more than 
the speed of transformation and key economic indicators. 
Therefore, a quantitative analysis covers several aspects re-
lated to socioeconomic change. The scores for the quality 
of democracy, market economy, and management perfor-
mance in post-socialist EU member states indicate that 
over the last decade, the countries that applied the shock 
therapy approach have performed significantly better in all 
these areas. This suggests that slow reformers are lagging 
behind in the development of democratic institutions and 
modern market economies, and presumably have insuf-
ficient capacities to rapidly catch up with fast reformers. 
Further research should scrutinise the institution-build-
ing related aspects of large-scale transformation, the deep 
roots of development, and distinctive circumstances in par-
ticular.
Keywords: post-socialism, institutions, reforms, gradualism, 
shock therapy
1.  Introduction*13
New Institutional Economics (NIE), complemented by insights in the fields 
of economic sociology and political economics, helped to understand post-so-
cialist transformation. Moreover, transition economics facilitated a new un-
derstanding of capitalism. Transition processes have raised numerous issues 
for which economic theory did not initially have ready answers. Policy-mak-
ers and incumbent governments were faced with two main challenges: the 
first was the choice of new institutions and the pace at which old ones would 
be replaced, while the second was their eagerness to find quick fixes that had 
* The authors would like to thank the participants of the International Conference 
“Society, Law, and Legal Culture” (held on 1–2 December 2016 at the Faculty of Law, Uni-
versity of Zagreb) for their useful comments on an earlier version of this paper. In addition, 
the authors are grateful to the reviewers for their valuable suggestions, which have greatly 
contributed to the quality of the final version of this article.
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worked in Western countries. However, in retrospect it became evident that 
the legacy of the socialist system had been underestimated.
This article compares the applicability of both gradualist and shock ther-
apy approaches to reform implementation in large-scale change. Using 
quantitative data, it aims to provide more evidence of the lessons learned 
from post-socialist transformation. Consequently, it adds a theoretical 
and empirical contribution to the body of literature on great transforma-
tions, with a particular focus on their speed and the acceptability of their 
policy solutions.
The article is structured as follows. Section two portrays the role of in-
stitutions and institutional economics in post-socialist transformation 
by emphasising the importance of (un)expected key success factors. In 
section three, two opposite schools of thought addressing post-socialist 
changes are presented, complemented by recent theoretical and empiri-
cal contributions. Section four goes on to provide a quantitative analysis 
of post-socialist EU member states grouped according to their choice of 
(early) reform strategies, and discusses the superior results of the big bang 
reformers. Section five concludes the discussion. 
2.  Institutions and Post-Socialist Transformation
The large-scale economic transition from socialism to capitalism has 
helped institutional economics to establish a mainstream position (Aligi-
cia, 2006; Kornai, Matyas & Roland, 2008). Listing key milestones in de-
velopment economics since the 1950s, Rodrik (2010) points out North’s 
work on institutions as a foundation for the wave of economic reforms 
emphasising improved governance. Rodrik (2009, p. 154) is convinced 
that the central question is no longer ‘Do institutions matter?’ but ‘Which 
institutions matter and how does one acquire them?’ Still, having listed 
the numerous achievements of New Institutional Economics, O. William-
son (2000, p. 608) stated: “Broad reach notwithstanding, the NIE is not 
and does not pretend to be an all-purpose construction, as the reform of 
the economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union illustrate.” 
He finds further confirmation of his statement in the Nobel Prize lectures 
held by Coase in 1991 and two years later by North.1
1 “… what we have is a very incomplete theory. All this is beginning to change and 
in this process I am glad to have played my part. The value of including such institutional 
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Opper (2008) claims that transition economies provide rare windows of 
opportunity to examine institutional change, which by radically chang-
ing institutional foundations leads towards an emergent market economy. 
Similarly, post-socialist economies are also considered useful laboratories 
for the change of economic systems (Djankov & Murrell, 2002). Moreo-
ver, increased research on transition could be explained both by its policy 
importance and by its relevance to economic theory that reaches an even 
better understanding of capitalism (Roland, 2000). At the outset, post-so-
cialist transformation was faced with very limited theoretical support, 
while at the same time the societies in question “faced a complex, multi-
level process, in which constitutional, legislative, institutional factors and 
informal social networks, and cultural values and attitudes, were all part 
of the problem … the ‘awesome challenge’ of simultaneously reorganising 
political, economic, and legal systems, and redefining national, ethnic, 
and cultural identities” (Aligicia, 2006, p. 36). 
Roland (2004, p. 110) seems to fully agree, stating that “the transition ex-
perience of the nineties was both a testing ground for the traditional body 
of economic theory and an invaluable source of new information about 
conditions for successful capitalist development.” In retrospect, it became 
evident that transitional events had resulted in a better understanding of 
institutions, their dynamics, and policy relevance (Roland, 2001, 2002; 
Opper, 2008). 
Noting that post-socialist transition had triggered an analysis of institu-
tional transformation and later extended to development issues, Brous-
seau, Garrouste & Raynaud (2011b, pp. 13–14) analyse two major ap-
proaches: the top-down and the bottom-up approach. In the top-down 
approach of administered change, key actors attempt to implement insti-
factors in the corpus of mainstream economics is made clear by recent events in Eastern 
Europe. These ex-communist countries are advised to move to a market economy, and their 
leaders wish to do so, but without the appropriate institutions no market economy of any 
significance is possible. If we knew more about our own economy we would be in a better 
position to advise them” (Coase, 1991).
“The implication is that transferring the formal political and economic rules of suc-
cessful western market economies to Third World and eastern European economies is not a 
sufficient condition for good economic performance. Privatization is not a panacea for solv-
ing poor economic performance … an essential part of development policy is the creation of 
polities that will create and enforce efficient property rights. However, we know very little 
about how to create such polities because the new political economy (the new institutional 
economics applied to politics) has been largely focused on the United States and developed 
polities. A pressing research need is to model Third World and eastern European polities” 
(North, 1993).
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tutional change within a shorter time period, whereas in the bottom-up 
approach social groups make long-term attempts to implement institu-
tional change. The top-down and bottom-up processes may happen si-
multaneously and have either synergistic or blocking effects. Easterly 
(2008) also notes that these two views are actually extremes and that most 
approaches lie somewhere in between. In addition to the previous expla-
nation, Easterly’s focus in respect of the top-down view is on creating new 
institutions from scratch and/or importing an accepted set of institutions 
from more developed countries and putting them into effect instantane-
ously.
At the same time, in the bottom-up approach change is usually incremen-
tal because it considers existing institutions to be influenced and limited 
by preceding ones. This makes this view evolutionary rather than revolu-
tionary (shock therapy). In the top-down view economists are required 
to recommend an optimal set of institutions that are usually completely 
new to a certain country, whereas in the bottom-up approach economists 
have the more specialised task of recommending steps of desirable grad-
ual change that will not disrupt the functioning of society and take into 
account the historical evolution of institutions. 
The opposite views should be taken into account as well, despite the fact 
that they did not focus on post-socialist European countries. The op-
ponents of the ‘institutions matter’ approach claim that the discussion 
regarding the importance of institutions has been dangerously oversim-
plified (Sachs 2003a; 2003b). The main criticism is rooted in a strong cor-
relation of economic growth and demographic variables with geographical 
and ecological variables, scarce natural resources, and malaria transmis-
sion in particular. Yet, it is claimed that “[i]nstitutions may matter, but 
they don’t matter exclusively” (Sachs, 2003b, p. 28) and that good institu-
tions surely matter, but bad ones can deteriorate the economic situation, 
even one starting in favourable conditions (Sachs, 2003b). Nonetheless, 
studies showing institutions as the key determinant of wealth and long-
term growth have vastly contributed to the ‘institutions matter’ stream 
(Hall & Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001; Easterly & 
Levine, 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi, 2004).
Discussing economic reforms, Murrell (1991a) issues a strict warning that 
blanket prescriptions should be treated with scepticism or avoided. In-
stead, one should rely on an economic reformer’s expertise and intuition 
when deciding between competing ideas and learning from experience. 
Rodrik (2009) also advocates the avoidance of ‘big ideas’ and understand-
ing that they do not translate easily into policies. Much additional lo-
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cally-relevant input is needed in order to produce a high-quality policy 
recommendation that fits a local economic and political context.2
Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco’s (2005) growth diagnostics methodolo-
gy, which has become accepted for countries at various levels of develop-
ment, is based on the idea that different barriers to growth are not equally 
binding and that a proper strategy should focus on the most dangerous 
ones. This diagnostics is also strongly advocated by Popov (2009), with 
the aim of identifying the subsequently elaborated missing ingredient. 
Rodrik (2010) stresses that successful countries have taken two major 
steps: first, they have identified the most serious barriers, and second, 
they have removed them with locally appropriate remedies. Furthermore, 
he claims: “Diagnostics requires pragmatism and eclecticism, in the use 
of both theory and evidence. It has no room for dogmatism, imported 
blueprints, or empirical purism” (Rodrik, 2010, p. 37).
Regarding methodology, diagnostics should show which random experi-
ments need to be undertaken. Because of the series of causes any devel-
opmental failure may have, it is important that the intervention under 
research should prove to be the remedy for the crucial causes, i.e., that it 
should pass the test of relevance. However, Rodrik (2010, p. 42) claims 
that diagnostic tools are still an insufficiently researched area. 
In order to summarise this part of the literature review, it is valuable to 
note that the key determinants of economic and political transformation 
should be found along these suggestions: first, in selecting the most rele-
vant institutions, adopting them and putting them into effect; second, in 
enhancing the understanding of institutions and their dynamics; third, in 
understanding the local circumstances; fourth, in recognising the largest 
obstacles to reform implementation; and fifth, in identifying locally ap-
propriate treatments for the removal of barriers and putting the selected 
institutions into effect. Finally, from the perspective of political economy, 
any reform is determined by the interaction between the policy-makers’ 
reform objectives and a set of economic and political institutions that are 
not directly under their control (IMF, 2004, p. 109). Therefore, in order 
2 “Local conditions matter not because economic principles change from place to 
place, but because those principles come institution-free and filling them out requires local 
knowledge” (Rodrik, 2009, p. 55); “... the institutions that have emerged in the Western 
world ... do not have to be faithfully copied in developing countries. The key is the incentive 
structure that is created, not the slavish imitations of Western institutions” (North, 2005, p. 
159); “the introduction of new institutions that fit poorly with underlying norms can make 
gradual changes in attitudes unlikely as people observe the costs of markets and bureaucra-
cies” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, pp. 320–321).
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to debate the potential effects of reform on economic performance, it is 
necessary to take into consideration factors that affect reform implemen-
tation strategy: primarily the speed at which reforms are carried out.
3.  Reform Speed and Implications Thereof for 
(Post-)Transitional3 Societies
Early on in the transition, the speed of transitional reforms was one of 
the most discussed topics among incumbent governments and scholars 
in post-socialist societies and their advisors in the Western community. 
Roland (2000, pp. 330–331) compares the postulates of the Washing-
ton Consensus (in other words, the big bang or shock therapy approach) 
on the one hand, and the Evolutionary-Institutionalist Perspective (EIP) 
(also named the gradualist or incrementalist approach) on the other hand, 
in order to present two opposing views of transition. The former was most-
ly applied in Central Europe and the Baltics, whereas the latter approach 
was predominantly implemented in Southeastern Europe and some for-
mer Soviet republics (Table 1). It is important to stress that despite the 
fact that reform speed is a dominant feature in the above synthesis por-
traying opposing approaches, it is actually only one of the several aspects 
addressing reform strategy choice.
Roland (2000; 2001) states that at the beginning of the transition EIP was 
predominantly supported by academics, whereas the Washington Con-
sensus4 approach was applied by international organisations. It had ini-
tially been developed for Latin American countries and was subsequently 
applied to Eastern European countries in the early 1990s. Rodrik (2010) 
considers the Washington Consensus to be the result of a presumptive 
mindset that, besides all of the previously elaborated features (comple-
3 In recent years some authors have started to use the term post-transition countries for 
the group of countries that started their post-socialist transformation in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Simultaneously, there has been a growing debate regarding the end of the tran-
sition. Hereinafter transition countries will be used for that group of countries. This choice 
of wording was additionally prompted by the fact that the same term is used by established 
scholars in numerous works, for instance, the volume Economies in Transition: The Long-Run 
View, edited by G. Roland (2012).
4 The Washington Consensus has raised many serious issues and debates, particularly 
regarding covert intentions disguised behind the beneficiary effects on targeted countries, 
yet this topic is outside the scope of this work.
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mentarity of reforms instead of sequencing and prioritisation, and the 
like), is biased towards universal remedies, best practices, and rules of 
thumb. The experimentalist approach is the opposite approach, being ex-
plicitly diagnostic in its strategy to identify barriers to development and 
to monitor and evaluate the experimental reforms undertaken in order 
to select focused reforms. It attempts to discover and implement locally 
applicable policy innovations and shortcuts that diminish political com-
plications. Numerous authors (Rodrik and Roland among others) empha-
sise China as a good illustration of the experimentalist approach, i.e., an 
evolutionary-institutionalist perspective. Roland (2000, p. 329) explains 
EIP to be rooted in “1) the institutionalist perspective given by mod-
ern economic theory and its methodology shaped by the development 
of non-cooperative game theory, 2) themes of the evolutionary approach 
to economics…, 3) a philosophical scepticism, influenced by Hayek and 
Popper, with a strong emphasis on our relative ignorance of economic and 
social systems and their transformation, an emphasis on the uncertainty 
associated with societal engineering, and a strong aversion toward any 
kind of Bolshevik-style campaigning in large-scale institutional transfor-
mation.”












Estonia Albania Croatia Azerbaijan Belarus
Latvia Bulgaria Hungary Armenia Uzbekistan
Lithuania Macedonia Slovenia Georgia Turkmenistan




Source: Adapted from Havrylyshyn (2007, p. 6) and Lenger (2008, p. 10); the same classifi-
cation is also used in Havrylyshyn, Meng & Tupy (2016). The analysed countries have been 
italicised by the authors. 
The key difference between the Washington Consensus and EIP is the ap-
proach towards uncertainty (Roland, 2000, pp. 329–332). Starting from 
initial conditions characterised by inefficiency, the Washington Consen-
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sus anticipates efficiency gains on the basis of the economic theory that 
transition leads to such efficiency gains, which is supported by the experi-
ence of capitalism in the USA and Europe. On the other hand, EIP takes 
into account unpredictable coordination models among economic agents 
and emphasises the limited understanding of large-scale changes and the 
aggregate uncertainty of transition results, despite best practices of capi-
talism that are available to be copied. The approach towards uncertainty 
results in different reform strategies. Washington Consensus protago-
nists will use early windows of opportunity and push reforms at immense 
speed, thereby creating irreversibility, whereas in EIP the underlying idea 
is to implement reforms gradually, thus building continuous and growing 
support and social cohesion, and at the same time taking the risk that 
bad reforms will be irreversible. Furthermore, the EIP approach devel-
ops transitional institutions appropriate for the starting conditions of a 
country and gradually allows them to change into better institutions. This 
process considers path dependence and avoids locked-in inefficiencies.
In contrast, the Washington Consensus initiates sudden large-scale 
changes by introducing ‘best practice’ institutions and by counting on 
their complementarities. Thus the logic of a ‘cavalry attack’ is used in 
order to break all existing resistance and the possible sabotage of former 
incumbent regimes (Roland, 2001, p. 37). The main claims of Washing-
ton Consensus proponents are that half-measures will not do and that 
such partial reforms usually worsen the situation because of second-best 
reasons (Williamson, 1992).
Regarding the type of institution, the Washington Consensus is mostly 
focused on property rights and the rights of shareholders, i.e., econom-
ic institutions. The EIP view is broader, as it covers political, legal, and 
economic institutions dealing with legal and financial change, an imple-
mentation framework, the organisation of government, as well as informal 
institutions like self-enforcing social norms that enhance the entrepre-
neurial spirit, commitment, and trust in a society. This makes the EIP per-
spective more comprehensive than the Washington Consensus regarding 
institutional change.
Both approaches place a rather strong emphasis on institutions, yet the 
shock therapists destroy the institutions of the preceding system and im-
mediately establish new ones that are considered to be the best fit. On 
the other hand, gradualists take into account existing institutions and take 
care to evolve these, while simultaneously adding new ones.
Washington Consensus policies finds their main supporters among the 
owners of newly privatised companies and, in a broader sense, among in-
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terest groups that are strong supporters of capitalism, whereas EIP relies 
more on entrepreneurs and the middle class that usually plays an impor-
tant role as voters in democracies. 
The Washington Consensus represents the neoliberal approach and 
stands for weaker government aiming to depoliticise the economy. EIP 
sees the government role in enforcing laws, property rights, and market 
rules in general, and therefore preventing imperfect competition, state 
capture, and corruption (Roland, 2000, pp. 329–333). In the majority of 
its aspects, EIP may be described as a bottom-up approach, whereas the 
Washington Consensus may be labelled as a top-down approach.
Advocating for an evolutionary paradigm, Murrell (1991b, pp. 7–9) 
stressed its key elements: persistence in organisational behaviour, exter-
nal influences on the economic environment that are significantly shaped 
by the past, selection processes and shifts aimed at the improvement of 
resources and the environment, greater variety of the types of organisa-
tions in society, and uncertainty and limited availability of information in 
policy-making processes. Murrell (1991b) further explains that the mar-
ket system is the most productive in the long run but sudden changes may 
negatively influence the output of enterprises. This phenomenon may not 
only be found in post-socialist economies that are transitioning from one 
system to another, but also in capitalist economies when important rules 
are changed. The distinctive issue regarding Eastern Europe is the num-
ber of companies that are forced to change at the same time, resulting 
in decreased output in one area and the pressure of adversity in another.
Roland (2000, pp. 335–340) also states that when analysing the results 
in Central and Eastern Europe in the light of the Washington Consensus 
trinity of liberalisation, privatisation, and stabilisation, one can easily un-
derstand the reasons for the growing consensus in the academic commu-
nity regarding the validity of EIP. Rodrik (2009, p. 55) comments on the 
results: “… reality has been unkind to our expectations. If Latin America 
was booming today and China and India were stagnating we would have 
an easier time fitting the world to our policy framework.”
Despite his inclination to experimentalism, Rodrik (2009, p. 165) warns of 
the dangers of its identification and implementation. First, there is a com-
mon confusion between self-conscious experimentalism and a gradual ap-
proach or delay aimed at ensuring privileged interests. Such aversion to re-
form is to be found in the former Soviet Union. In contrast, there have been 
gradual attempts to use local knowledge in order to better develop reforms 
for local needs. In that regard, Slovenia is a successful case of gradualism 
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(Whitley, Jaklič & Hočevar, 2000). A second issue is the direct costs and 
opportunity costs of experimentation compared to importing blueprints. It 
is important to thoroughly analyse the costs because the experimentalist 
approach causes opportunity costs as well, and inevitably influences future 
institutional development. Even if institutional arrangements are not trans-
ferred from other countries, it is possible to learn from these and hence 
diminish the costs of pure experimentalism (Rodrik, 2009, p. 165). Alston 
et al. (2010) make the same argument as they discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of role models; the problem with the Washington Consensus 
was the blind importation of policies instead of learning from other coun-
tries’ experiences and modifying local policies and institutions. Still, shock 
therapy proponents consider it was already obvious in the 1990s that this 
approach resulted in better economic performance as shown by the differ-
ences in the GDP of Eastern European rapid liberalisers versus the slow 
reformers (Shleifer & Vishny, 1999, pp. 228–233). Furthermore, they argue 
that shock therapy vastly contributes to depoliticisation because it elimi-
nates price controls as the main tool of central planners, maintains tougher 
budget constraints, and diminishes the power that the state exercises over 
firms. Nonetheless, they warn that shock therapy does not guarantee depo-
liticisation or transformation of government institutions. 
Throughout the 1990s, the overall impression was that the gradual ap-
proach was getting an increasing number of proponents among academ-
ics, policy advisers, and international organisations. The major concern 
was that the shock therapy approach caused increased poverty and dimin-
ished social capital; i.e., it resulted in increased pain in transition (Mur-
rell, 1996; UNDP, 1998; Stiglitz, 1999). It seemed that the gradualist 
approach resulted in better performance in the initial stages of transition. 
However, the decline of economic results in all post-socialist societies 
was mostly followed by the recovery of fast reformers and negative trends 
among gradualist reformers. Fischer and Sahay (2000) link fast Central 
and East European (CEE) reformers with faster recovery and higher 
economic growth. Analysing the first 15 years of transition, Havrylyshyn 
(2007) found that rapid reformers had developed better institutions than 
slow reformers, and shown better economic performance and lower ine-
quality than slow reformers. Ten years later Havrylyshyn, Meng and Tupy 
(2016) confirmed that rapid reformers outperformed slow reformers in 
the first 25 years of transition.
However, the approach to transition reforms should be more nuanced 
than a mere dichotomy (as it may seem at first glance): big bang versus 
gradualism or the market versus the state. The essence of transitional pro-
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cesses lies in institution building (Kolodko, 1999; Popov, 2000, 2006; Trivić 
& Petković, 2015; Stiglitz, 2016). Optimal transitional policies are context- 
and path-dependent and require a properly diagnosed ‘missing ingredient’ 
because it is crucial for development and growth (Popov, 2009). In retro-
spect, “… the story of the successes and failures of transition is not real-
ly the story of consistent shock therapy and inconsistent gradualism. The 
major plot of the post-socialist transformation ‘novel’ is the preservation of 
strong institutions in some countries (very different, in other respects, from 
central Europe and Estonia to China, Uzbekistan and Belarus) and the col-
lapse of these institutions in the other countries. At least 90 per cent of this 
story is about government failure (strength of state institutions), not about 
market failure (liberalization)” (Popov, 2009, p. 13).
4.  Empirical Analysis Beyond Key Economic 
Indicators: The Last Ten Years in (Post-)
Transitional Economies
Using quantitative data, this article investigates the effects of opposite 
approaches to reform implementation in post-socialist European Union 
member states during the period 2006–2016. This is done by analysing he 
findings of the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI), a glob-
al ranking of democracy, market economy, and political management. 
We compare the performance profiles for Bulgaria,5 the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia (grouped together 
as “shock therapy” countries), analyse the trajectories of these countries 
over time and compare them to Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Romania 
(grouped together as “gradualist” countries). We thus seek to examine 
whether and how these two groups differ or possibly converge. This mul-
tidimensional comparison should provide quantitative evidence as to the 
lessons learned from post-socialist transformation. 
The authors are aware of the shortcomings of aggregate data despite their 
widespread use. First, as noted by Rodrik (2009, pp. 188–189), measure-
ments of institutional quality predominantly reflect the perception of how 
rules function – not their substance. In addition, they are influenced by 
many aspects of the economic environment as a whole. Reverse causality 
5 Bulgaria is the only country in the group that did not sustain shock therapy; yet, as can 
be seen in the previous section, it is most commonly categorised in the shock therapy group.
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also plays a very important role, particularly in times of strong economic 
growth or in a period of crisis. A more challenging difficulty when analys-
ing these measurements is that the results do not show the specific rules 
that have caused the institutional outcome that is being measured. A sec-
ond issue is the reality of the data obtained by the measurement. Shirley 
(2010, p. 91) finds that the Doing Business Survey, for instance, fails to 
measure both the opportunity costs of certain procedures necessary for 
business development and the need to engage facilitators and lawyers in 
order to complete certain bureaucratic processes. Third, when analysing 
respondents, there are common biases found in both the surveys of the 
experts and of the general public. On the one hand, experts usually know 
the benchmark position of the surveyed country, they may be influenced 
by recent information from the media, they may be in favour of a certain 
opinion for reasons that are not relevant, and may also use the knowledge 
from their particular field to answer questions from other fields. On the 
other hand, ordinary people may also be biased by the media and oth-
er sources of information, by their poor or inadequate knowledge and 
memory in certain areas, by the way questions are asked, and by the tacit 
metric that is largely dependent on the person being asked (Shirley, 2010, 
p. 89). Fourth, partly in line with Rodrik’s claim in the first shortcom-
ing, criticism is also expressed regarding indicators measuring the effect 
of institutions on economic performance; these are deemed to be “often 
based on subjective evaluations, contain significant noise, are suspiciously 
volatile, and are likely to be biased or contaminated by perceptions of a 
country’s economic performance”, yet many institutional indicators are 
considered to be “completely objective or generated formulaically from 
objective data and therefore less subject to the contamination problem” 
(Jellema & Roland, 2011, p. 108). Finally, despite numerous advances, it 
is considered that measuring institutions is overall still in its early stages. 
Most of the data can be used to follow macro developments over time, 
but not to analyse certain micro developments. The current measures still 
need to be refined in order to be useful for a deep understanding of insti-
tutions (Shirley, 2010, pp. 79–99). Yet, having studied the development 
of market-friendly institutions and the progress of macroeconomic stabi-
lisation in transition economies in the 1990s, Havrylyshyn and Van Rood-
en (2003) concluded that the selected indicators6 measuring institutional 
6 They used the following indicators: Index of Economic Freedom published by The 
Heritage Foundation; Political and Civil Rights, Democratic Freedom, Economic Freedom, 
Rule of Law and Public Administration published by Freedom House; Reform Index and 
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quality showed a high consistency, which could also mean their consisten-
cy in making the same mistakes. Nonetheless, despite the fact that some 
countries have been ranked differently than one would expect, Havrylyshyn 
and Van Rooden (2003) considered this great similarity of results to be a 
good sign of the indicators’ quality. Nee (2003, p. 53) stresses the addition-
al value of firm-centric data for the development of institutional analysis, 
primarily through the measurement of transaction costs as a central con-
cept of NIE: “much of this work to date has involved qualitative historical 
analysis of one or two case studies. While such work has led to advances in 
understanding the relationship between institutions and economic behav-
iour, the use of quantitative methods moving beyond case studies to engage 
systematic cross-national firm-level studies can contribute to specifying and 
explicating how variable features of the institutional environment affect 
firms’ behaviour in the global economy ... using firm-centric data opens the 
way for a more differentiated account of how the institutional environment 
influences economic behaviour … The problem with national level aggre-
gate data is that it does not measure the effect of variation in institutional 
conditions on the firm and entrepreneur.”
To conclude, although attempts to measure institutions (and reforms) by 
means of aggregating various variables and constructing indices from dif-
ferent areas (labour/product/financial/other markets) are characterised by 
many disadvantages usually associated with composite indices (for details 
see OECD, 2008), the existence of such indicators opens up the possi-
bility of comparing the degree of reform of economic and political insti-
tutions (both across countries and over time) and analysing the impacts 
of this on selected economic performance indicators. Hence, bearing in 
mind the scope of this paper and all of the arguments provided, composite 
indicators appear to be an appropriate choice in the given circumstances – 
the availability of sources in particular. In the research strategy employed, 
an effort has been made to consider countries as ‘configurations’ of in-
teracting institutions in a comparative analysis, as suggested by Kogut 
(2010). In that sense, none of the factors are labelled essential in deter-
mining performance but this does not imply that they are equally impor-
tant. Moreover, based on Havrylyshyn (2007) and Havrylyshyn, Meng 
& Tupy (2016), countries are considered to be affiliated with the same 
group of fast or slow reformers since the beginning of transition.
Legal Index by EBRD; Property Rights and Public Administration by World Bank; and Po-
litical Risk by Euromoney. The countries included were from Central and Eastern Europe, 
the Baltics, and Commonwealth of Independent States.
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Graph 1. Nominal GDP per capita (in US dollars): Shock therapy versus 
gradualist approach countries, 1989–2017
Source: IMF; authors’ calculation.
Note: there are no available data for Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Slovakia, or Slovenia for the period 1989–1991.
The data in Graph 1 show that the shock therapy countries lagged behind the 
countries using the gradualist approach until the begininning of 2008, after 
which the trend changed and the shock therapy countries actually surpassed 
the gradualist ones (although the difference in the level of GDP per capita 
between the selected groups of countries is not significant). The fact that the 
year 2008 was the first year of the global economic crisis surely had a signif-
icant effect on the choice of further reform strategies that rely on previously 
implemented reforms. According to this line of reasoning, Krueger (1995, p. 
125) points out that the economic situation may be viewed as a demand for 
reform, where this demand is less pronounced under favourable economic 
conditions. Thus economic crises may encourage reform, because the eco-
nomic downturn constitutes a further suggestion that the existing policies 
are no longer viable. Consequently, crises introduce an element of urgency 
into the policy process, weaken resistance to reform, and increase the cost 
of reform failure (Lora, 2000; Drazen & Easterly, 2001; Alesina, Ardagna & 
Trebbi, 2006; Høj et al., 2006; Zemanek, Belke & Schnabl, 2009). 
Therefore, moving beyond the GDP analysis, this paper attempts to present 





























































of the speed of reforms, and providing insights into institution-building ca-
pacities. With this goal in mind, we use the BTI index, which analyses and 
evaluates whether and how developing countries and countries in transi-
tion are steering social change towards democracy and the market econ-
omy. The BTI captures many relevant aspects of reform implementation 
that are intrinsic to shock therapy versus gradualist views (as presented in 
previous sections). The BTI is published every two years for 129 countries. 
Generally, the BTI aggregates the results of this comprehensive study of 
transformation processes and political management into two indices: the 
Status Index and the Management Index (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017). 
The Status Index, with its two analytic dimensions of political and econom-
ic transformation, identifies where each of the 129 countries stands on its 
path towards democracy under the rule of law and a social market econo-
my (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017). Focusing on the quality of governance, 
the Management Index assesses the acumen with which decision-makers 
steer political processes (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017). Furthermore, the 
Management Index consists of five criteria, which are based on 20 indica-
tors. A government’s management performance is weighted with the level 
of difficulty, which is derived from three qualitative and three quantitative 
indicators. These indicators reflect the observation that each country’s qual-
ity of transformation is influenced by structural constraints (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, 2017). Finally, according to Bertelsmann Stiftung (2017), difficult 
conditions and the scarcity of resources in a given country are factored into 
the equation for political management performance.
Graphs 2 and 3 report the Status Index scores for selected European coun-
tries (divided into the shock therapy group versus the gradualist approach 
group) for the period 2006–2016. The data for the two analysed groups 
of countries are calculated based on the arithmetic mean of the observed 
index. The analysed data show that there is a continuous and growing gap 
in evidence between these two groups of countries. More precisely, the 
countries that applied the shock therapy approach recorded better results 
on the observed index over the entire observed period. The continuous 
decline of the gradualist approach countries is visible and has been more 
pronounced since 2008. Specifically, the Czech Republic achieved the best 
results and Romania scored the worst in the observed period. In addition, 
the largest drop in the index from 2006 to 2016 was recorded by Hunga-
ry and Croatia. Additionally, according to the Status Index, in 2016 the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slove-
nia were classed as highly advanced. On the other hand, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Hungary, and Romania were classed as advanced economies and this claim 
partially confirms previously elaborated findings on the necessity of a more 
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nuanced approach as opposed to a merely dichotomic one when analysing 
and grouping countries based on their reform strategies.
Graph 2. Status Index scores in transitional EU countries, 2006–2016
Source: The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI); authors’ calculation.
Graph 3. Status Index: Shock therapy versus gradualist approach countries, 
2006–2016




























Graph 4 shows the trajectories of the democracy status scores according 
to previously selected criteria for the period 2006–2016. In this respect, 
the status of democracy encompasses the following criteria: stateness, po-
litical participation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions, and 
political and social integration. When data are compared over time, the 
results indicate a continuous and growing gap between the group of coun-
tries that applied the shock therapy approach and the group of countries 
that applied the gradualist approach (as is the case with the Status Index). 
According to 2016 data, all countries except Hungary were considered 
democracies in the process of consolidation. Hungary was classed as a 
defective democracy and recorded the largest drop in the index in the 
observed ten-year period. However, among all the democracies in the pro-
cess of consolidation, Croatia, Hungary, and Romania enjoyed the lowest 
rank in 2016 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017).
Graph 4. Democracy Status: Shock therapy versus gradualist approach coun-
tries, 2006–2016
Source: The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI); authors’ calculation.
The BTI criteria that measure the state of development of a market econ-
omy include the level of socioeconomic development, the organisation of 
the market and competition, currency and price stability, private prop-
erty, the welfare regime, economic performance, and sustainability. The 





































data, until 2012 the paths of the observed countries were moving in the 
same direction. Since 2012 the trajectories have been moving in different 
directions. More precisely, the countries that applied the shock therapy 
approach recorded growing index values, whereas countries that applied 
the gradualist approach recorded decreased index values. Furthermore, 
according to data from 2016, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, and Romania 
were classed in the functioning economies category, while the Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia were 
classed as developed economies. Hungary recorded the largest drop in the 
index in the observed ten-year period.
Graph 5, Market economy status: Shock therapy versus gradualist countries, 
2006–2016
Source: The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI); authors’ calculation.
The Management Index captures the level of difficulty, steering capa-
bility, resource efficiency, consensus-building, and international cooper-
ation. Its scores are shown in Graph 6. This index ranks countries ac-
cording to their leadership’s political management performance. Based 
on the graphical data, it may be concluded that both groups of countries 
have recorded the lowest index values in relation to other observed indi-
ces. However, there is also a significant gap between these two groups of 
countries, which is in favour of the shock therapy approach. Moreover, 
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via, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are classed as countries with 
good management; Estonia and Lithuania as countries with very good 
management; and only Hungary (which has also recorded the largest drop 
in the index in the observed ten-year period) is classed as a country with 
moderate management. The largest ten-year improvement in the index 
value may be observed in the case of Poland.
Graph 6. Management Index: Shock therapy versus gradualist countries, 
2006–2016
Source: The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI); authors’ calculation.
As additional robustness checks, we have compared the global competi-
tiveness results and annual GDP growth rate of the monitored groups of 
countries. Graph 7 shows the trends of the Global Competitiveness Index 
(GCI) values that quantify the impact of a number of factors shaping 
country competitiveness, with a special focus on macroeconomic perfor-
mance, the quality of the country’s institutions, and the state of the coun-
try’s technology and supporting infrastructure. The data were available 
for the period 2005–2017, which is considered suitable because of the 







































Graph 7. The Global Competitiveness Index: Shock therapy versus gradualist 
countries, 2005–2017
Source: World Economic Forum. The Global Competitiveness Index dataset 2005-2017; 
authors’ calculations.
Graph 8. GDP growth rate (%): Shock therapy versus gradualist countries, 
1996–2016
Source: Authors’ calculation based on World Bank national accounts data, and OECD na-















































































































































Graph 8 shows GDP growth trajectories for both the shock therapy and 
gradualist countries and indicates considerably weaker results for the lat-
ter group of countries when compared to the former. The only exception 
is 2009 with exceptionally low GDP growth rates caused by the global 
financial crisis. In addition, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia had very high 
negative growth rates in 2009 and this was reflected in the average group 
result. Overall, the findings of Graphs 7 and 8, which were used as ad-
ditional robustness checks, are in line with the results based on BTI and 
GDP per capita data.
This descriptive analysis suggests an evident gap between the countries that 
applied the shock therapy approach and those that applied the gradualist 
approach. These findings are supported by the analysis of the quality of 
democracy, market economy, management performance, competitiveness, 
and GDP levels and growth. The countries which applied the shock therapy 
approach have performed significantly better based on all the analysed rat-
ings. This suggests that the countries which applied the gradualist approach 
(Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Romania) are lagging behind in the evo-
lution of democratic institutions and modern market economies, and pre-
sumably have insufficient capacities to rapidly catch up with Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia.
Nevertheless, we should emphasise some methodological limitations. 
First, the BTI survey process will always contain a degree of subjectivity, 
although it is designed to minimise subjective factors as much as possible 
throughout the process (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017). In other words, one 
of the main strengths of the BTI is that it allows researchers to combine 
the analysis of participation and equality levels, but there is also a high de-
gree of standardisation in its coding procedures (Fernandez et al., 2015). 
However, the fact that a single country expert writes a country report ad-
dressing 49 questions poses some risks, because it is arguably difficult to 
find a country expert who is knowledgeable about all the aspects of a given 
polity to the same degree (Fernandez et al., 2015). Additionally, this ap-
 proach does not take into consideration that countries could have accel-
erated (or slowed down) their reforms throughout the period 2006–2016. 
Still, in order to check the developments of institutional transformation 
and their results, we have also used competitiveness, GDP per capita, and 
GDP growth data. For the most recent categorisation we have relied on 
researchers who have been analysing this topic since its inception, such as 
Havrylyshyn, Meng and Tupy (2016), and they show no changes in coun-
try affiliation. Finally, if countries with a somewhat different degree of 
development are grouped together, then one group may not only achieve 
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superior performance, but that aggregation covers some other differences 
as well. These other differences are outside the scope of this research, as 
it is deemed that multidimensional transformation as a whole is appro-
priately addressed by using several data sets mostly presented through 
composite indices.
5.  Conclusion
In the early post-socialist years, the gradualist approach (also named the 
Evolutionary-Institutionalist Perspective and the incrementalist view) was 
considered to be more comprehensive and appropriate than shock thera-
py (also called the Washington Consensus and the big bang approach) to 
address complex transition processes in Eastern Europe. In the first transi-
tional decade, there appeared to be a growing consensus among academics, 
policy-makers, and practitioners in this regard. This was partly a result of 
deteriorating living standards and a sharp fall in the output of countries ap-
plying the shock therapy approach. However, 15 years after the transition 
had begun, the fast reformers had outperformed the slow reformers. At 
that time, all these countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, 
Poland, and Slovakia) joined the EU together with Slovenia and Hungary 
(the slow reformers). In subsequent enlargement waves Bulgaria, Romania, 
and Croatia joined the EU as well. They all have socialist legacies and simi-
lar formal institutions adopted through EU accession. Yet their approaches 
to large-scale transformation were different, regarding both reform speed 
and other complementary dimensions of change. In line with (recent) the-
oretical contributions, multidimensional indicators were used to bench-
mark post-socialist EU member states that had applied either the shock 
therapy or the gradualist approach. The most recent data indicate that fast 
reformers are still outperforming slow reformers in all the observed areas. 
Besides the obviously better results of the fast reformers, this finding im-
plies a non-existing convergence between the analysed groups of countries, 
despite similar economic and political institutions. 
Further research on this topic should tackle the deep roots of socioeco-
nomic development and path-dependent choices (including reform speed), 
proximity to Western countries, the possible effects of other specific cir-
cumstances (such as war), the importance of selected institutions on the 
performance of post-socialist non-EU members, and other limitations that 
have remained outside the scope of this paper. The discussion needs to 
remain open, as institution building is a process that spans several decades.
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THE SPEED OF LARGE-SCALE TRANSFORMATION OF 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS: INSIGHTS FROM 
(POST-)TRANSTITIONAL EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES
Summary
This article compares the applicability of both the gradual and the shock thera-
py approach to reform implementation in large-scale change. Using quantitative 
data, it aims to provide more evidence for the lessons learned from post-socialist 
transformation. Hence it adds a theoretical and an empirical contribution to 
the body of literature on great transformations, focusing on their speed and the 
acceptability of related policy solutions.
Despite the predominant inclination towards the gradualist approach to re-
forms in the initial transition years, economic indicators suggest that the big 
bang reformers have demonstrated a superior performance over the last (few) 
decade(s). Still, the approach to (post-)transition processes should be multidi-
mensional and include more than the speed of transformation and key economic 
indicators. Therefore, a quantitative analysis covers several aspects of socioeco-
nomic change. The analysis of the quality of democracy, market economy, and 
management performance in post-socialist EU member states indicates that over 
the last decade the countries that applied the shock therapy approach have 
performed significantly better in all these areas. This suggests that slow reformers 
are lagging behind in the development of democratic institutions and a modern 
market economy, and presumably have insufficient capacities to rapidly catch 
up with fast reformers.
Further research on this topic should tackle the deep roots of socioeconomic 
development and path-dependent choices (reform speed included), proximity to 
Western countries, the possible effects of other specific circumstances (such as 
war), the importance of selected institutions on the performance of post-socialist 
non-EU member states, and other limitations.
Keywords: post-socialism, institutions, reforms, gradualism, shock therapy
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BRZINA PROVEDBE OPSEŽNIH PRETVORBI POLITIČKIH 
I EKONOMSKIH INSTITUCIJA: SPOZNAJE IZ (POST-)
TRANZICIJSKIH DRŽAVA EUROPSKE UNIJE
Sažetak
Rad se bavi provedbom reformi u sklopu opsežnih promjena, te se u tom svjetlu 
uspoređuje primjenjivost postupnoga pristupa i pristupa provedbe “šok terapi-
je”. Kvantitativnim se podacima nastoji doprinijeti znanjima stečenim tijekom 
postsocijalističke pretvorbe, te se teorijskim i empirijskim saznanjima doprinosi 
literaturi iz područja opsežnih promjena, uz poseban fokus na brzinu i prihvat-
ljivost povezanih političkih rješenja. Iako se na početku tranzicijskog razdoblja 
naginjalo gradualizmu pri provedbi reformi, posljednjih desetljeća superiorni 
ekonomski pokazatelji govore u prilog država koje su reforme provele metodom 
velikoga praska. Ipak, pristup posttranzicijskim procesima trebao bi biti više-
dimenzionalan i uključivati više od puke brzine pretvorbe i ključnih ekonom-
skih pokazatelja, stoga se kvantitativna analiza bavi nekolicinom aspekata 
socioekonomskih promjena. Analiza kvalitete demokracije, tržišne ekonomije i 
rezultata upravljanja u postsocijalističkim državama Europske unije upućuje 
na zaključak da su one države koje su reforme provele “šok terapijom” postigle 
znatno bolje rezultate u navedenim područjima. To pak upućuje na zaključak 
da države koje postupno provode reforme zaostaju u područjima razvoja de-
mokratskih institucija i moderne tržišne ekonomije, te se nameće pretpostavka 
da nemaju dovoljne kapacitete kako bi uvhatile korak s državama koje reforme 
provode ubrzano. Daljnja istraživanja u ovom području trebala bi se baviti du-
binskim uzrocima socioekonomskog razvoja i odabira koji ovise o putu za koji se 
pojedina država odlučila (a što uključuje brzinu provedbe reformi), blizinom dr-
žavama Zapadne Europe, mogućim učincima drugih specifičnih okolnosti (npr. 
ratova), važnosti odabranih institucija u odnosu na rezultate postsocijalističkih 
država koje nisu članice Europske unije, te drugih ograničenja. 
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